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Abstract
In this work we carry out an exploratory analysis of online conversations on the Italian
Facebook during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. We analyze the circulation of controversial
topics associated with the origin of the virus, which involve popular targets of misinformation,
such as migrants and 5G technology. We collected over 1.5 M posts in Italian language and
related to COVID-19, shared by nearly 80k public pages and groups for a period of four
months since January 2020. Overall, we find that potentially harmful content shared by
unreliable sources is substantially negligible compared to traditional news websites, and
that discussions over controversial topics has a limited engagement w.r.t to the pandemic
in general. Besides, we highlight a “small-worldness” effect in the URL sharing diffusion
network, indicating that users navigating through a limited set of pages could reach almost
the entire pool of shared content related to the pandemic, thus being easily exposed to
harmful propaganda as well as to verified information on the virus.
Keywords— COVID-19, Disinformation, Infodemic, Online Social Networks, Facebook
1 Introduction and related work
The spread of a novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in the past months has changed in an unprecedented way
the everyday life of people on a global scale. According to World Health Organization (WHO), at the
time of this writing the pandemic has caused over 3.5 M confirmed cases, with more than 250k fatalities
globally speaking1. Italy, in particular, has been one of the first European countries to be severely hit
by the pandemic, as the virus spread outside China borders at the end of January, and to implement
national lockdown on the 9th of March [1, 2]. Following Italy and China, national lockdowns have been
adopted by most countries around the world, drastically reducing mobility flows in order to circumvent
the spread [3].
In relation to the emergency, the term “infodemic” has been coined to describe the risks related to the
massive spread of harmful and malicious content on online social platforms [4], as misinformation could
support the spread of the virus undermining medical efforts and, at the same time, drive societal mistrust
producing other direct damages [4]. In response, several contemporary works have provided different per-
spectives on this phenomenon. Authors of [5] analyzed more than 100 millions Twitter messages posted
worldwide in 64 languages and found correspondence between waves of unreliable and low-quality infor-
mation and the epidemic ones. Authors of [6] have investigated the prevalence of low-credibility content
in relation to the activity of social bots, showing that the combined amount of unreliable information
is comparable to the retweets of articles published on The New York Times alone. Finally, authors of
[7] have carried out a comparative analysis of information diffusion on different social platforms, from
Twitter to Reddit, finding different volumes of misinformation in different environments.
1https://covid19.who.int
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As a matter of fact, ever since 2016 US presidential elections we witnessed to a growing concern of the
research community over deceptive information spreading on online social networks [8, 9, 10, 11]. In Italy,
according to Reuters, trust in news is today particularly low [12], and previous research has highlighted the
exposure to online disinformation in several political circumstances, from 2016 Constitutional Referendum
to 2019 European Parliament elections [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. A recent questionnaire by SOMA observatory
on disinformation spreading on online social media2 (a project funded by the European Union) showed
that people relied on official channels used by authoritative institutions in order to inform about the
pandemic. Interestingly, social media were not the primary source of information during the crisis.
In this work we adopt a consolidated strategy to label news articles at the source level [18, 19, 10, 20,
21] and investigate accordingly the diffusion of different kinds of information on Facebook. We thus use the
term “disinformation” as a shorthand for unreliable information in several forms, all potentially harmful,
including false news, click-bait, propaganda, conspiracy theories and unverified rumours [20, 21]. We use
instead the term “mainstream” to indicate traditional news websites which convey reliable and accurate
information. This approach has been mainly used for Twitter, which however exhibits a declining trend
as a platform to consume online news [12, 17]. Similar to [22], we leverage Crowdtangle platform to collect
posts related to COVID-19 from Facebook public pages and groups. We use a set of keywords related to
the epidemic and we limit the search to posts in the Italian language. The overall dataset accounts for over
1.5 M public posts shared by almost 80k unique pages/groups. We investigate the prevalence of reliable
vs non-reliable information by analysing the domain of URLs included in such posts. In particular, we are
interested in understanding how specific disinformation narratives compete with official communications.
To this aim, we further specify keywords related to three different controversial topics that have been
trending in the past few months, all related to the origins of the novel coronavirus: (1) the alleged
correlation between COVID-19 and migrants, (2) between the virus and 5G technology, and (3) rumours
about the artificial origin of the virus.
This work provides the following main contributions:
• We evaluate the prevalence of COVID-19 (and related controversial topics) on the Italian Facebook,
identifying the key players and the most relevant pieces of content in the information ecosystem in
terms of both volume of posts and generated engagement.
• We study how these issues shaped the debate on Facebook, quantifying the polarization of groups
and pages w.r.t. topics of discussion and measuring the respective lexical/semantic divergence.
• We analyze patterns in the URL sharing network of groups/pages, observing that the majority of
groups and pages interact in a “small-world”, and discarding the hypothesis that different groups
draw upon fully separate pools of web resources.
• We focus on the connections among URLs related to controversial topics and among groups/pages
where these URLs where shared, to assess the existence of clusters induced by different sources of
information and to ascertain that centrality in these networks is not correlated with high engage-
ment.
The outline of this paper is the following: we first describe the methodology applied, including the
collection of data from Facebook, the taxonomy of news sources and controversial topics, and both text
and network analysis tools; then we describe our contributions, and finally we draw conclusions and
future work.
2 Methodology
2.1 Facebook data collection
We used CrowdTangle’s “historical data” interface [23] to fetch posts (in Italian language) shared by
public pages and groups since January 1st 2020 until May 12th 2020 and containing any of the following
keywords: virus, coronavirus, covid, sars-cov-2, sars cov 2, pandemia, epidemia, pandemic, epidemic.
The tool only tracks public posts made by public accounts or groups. Besides, it does not track every
public account3 and does not track neither private profiles nor private groups. For each post we collected
the number of public interactions (likes, reactions, comments, shares, upvotes and three second views)
2http://www.t-6.it/report-on-the-role-of-the-information-in-the-emergency-covid-19-impacts-and-consequences-on-people-behaviors-report/
3All pages with at least 100K likes are fully retained. For details on the coverage for pages with less likes we
refer the reader to https://help.crowdtangle.com/en/articles/1140930-what-is-crowdtangle-tracking.
2
5g Labs Migrants Intersection Union Total
Posts 10937 (0.7%) 25695 (1.6%) 38486 (2.4%) 39 (0.024%) 72440 (4.6%) 1588536
Accounts 5493 (9.7%) 7076 (12.5%) 11238 (19.9%) 1958 (3.5%) 15865 (28.8%) 56436
Groups’ Posts 5817 15278 21135 31 40175 715104
Groups 3194 4129 6571 1232 9007 28721
Pages’ Posts 5120 10417 17351 8 873432 873432
Pages 2299 2947 4667 726 6858 27715
Table 1: Number of posts and accounts (groups and pages) for each controversial topic, and
altogether.
as well as Uniform Resource Locators (URL) attached with it. Our collection contains overall 1.59 M
posts shared by 87,426 unique Facebook pages/groups. In the rest of the paper, we use “accounts” as a
shorthand to indicate the entire set of pages and groups. Data is not publicly available, but it can be
provided to academics and non-profit organizations upon request to the platform.
2.2 Mainstream and disinformation news
To understand the prevalence of reliable vs non-reliable information we refer to the lists of news outlets
compiled in [17, 21]. We use the coarse “source-based” approach adopted in the literature [10, 19, 20] to
label online news articles (i.e., links shared in Facebook posts) in two classes according to their domain:
(1) Disinformation sources, which notably publish a variety of harmful information, from hyper-partisan
stories to false news and conspiracy theories; (2) Mainstream sources, which (mostly) provide accurate
and reliable news reporting. However, this classification might not always hold since unreliable websites
do share also true news, and incorrect news coverage on traditional outlets is not rare [9]. For what
concerns unreliable news, we further partition the class into four distinct sets according to the geographic
area: European (EU), Italian (IT), Russian (RU) and US sources. The overall list contains 25 Italian
sources for the Mainstream domain whereas for the disinformation domain we count 25 EU sources, 52
Italian sources, 13 Russian sources and 22 US sources.
2.3 Controversial topics
In our analysis, we focus on three specific topics which were particularly exposed to disinformation during
the infodemic4:
• MIGRANTS: conspiracy theories that attempt to correlate the spread of the virus with migration
flows. These are mainly promoted by far-right communities to foster racial hate. Some of the related
keywords are: migranti, immigrati, ong, barconi, extracomunitari, africa.
• LABS: rumours that have been used as political weapons to attribute the origins of the pandemic
to the development of a bioweapon to be used by China and/or to undermine the forthcoming U.S.
presidential elections. Some of the related keywords are: laboratorio, ricerca, sperimentazione.
• 5G: hoaxes that can be summarized in two main streams, those claiming that 5G activates COVID-
19 and those that deny the existence of the novel coronavirus and attribute its symptoms to
reactions to 5G waves. Both lines are obviously false and not supported by scientific evidence.
Some of the related keywords are: 5g, onde, radiazioni, elettromagnetismo.
A complete list of keywords for each topic is available in the Appendix. For sake of simplicity, we will
refer to an account as a “MIGRANTS” account (and likewise for the other topics) if the account shared
at least N = 2 posts which contain a keyword in the related list; the same holds for URLs if the associated
post contained a keyword matching the related topic. Finally, we will denote any account or URL as
“controversial” if it is related to at least one of the three topics. In Table 1 we show a breakdown of the
dataset in terms of posts and accounts. Note that the number of accounts is lower due to a preprocessing
step described in the following paragraph.
4https://www.newsguardtech.com/covid-19-myths/
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2.4 Text analysis
We cleaned and pre-processed posts’ textual content as follows. Firstly, strings are lower cased and URLs,
punctuation, emojis and Italian stop words (collected from spacy Python library) are removed. We also
remove words related to the COVID-19 as they act as stop word for our analysis. Then, we tokenize
texts using nltk Python library [24], and we remove tokens shorter than 4 or longer than 20 characters.
Finally we embed accounts into vectors using Tf-Idf statistic. We firstly group tokens by account. To
reduce noise effects we remove accounts with only 1 post and accounts with less than 20 tokens in total,
obtaining 56,436 accounts from an original amount of 87,426. We compute the Tf-Idf of the cleaned
strings, neglecting tokens that appeared less than 5 times in the whole corpus. Finally, for each account
we obtain a sparse 137,901-dimensional embedding vector.
2.5 Network analysis
We leverage tools from network science [25, 26] in order to investigate the diffusion network of content
shared on Facebook. We use a bipartite graph formulation to link together accounts and URLs. Precisely,
we draw an un-directed weighted edge between an account a and an URL u if and only if u was shared
at least once on/by a; the weight w(a,u) of the edge (a, u) counts how many times u was shared on/by
a. This graph has 983,582 vertices (78,760 accounts and 904,822 URLs) and 1,374,921 edges. We then
focus on the controversial bipartite graph defined as the subgraph of the accounts-URLs graph induced
by controversial URLs. This subgraph has 55,411 vertices (18,681 accounts and 36,730 URLs) and 81,707
edges. Finally, we consider the two graphs of controversial URLs and controversial accounts obtained by
projecting the giant component of the aforementioned controversial bipartite graph upon the two layers
of URLs and accounts, respectively. In other words, URLs are connected if and only if there is at least
one account that shared both, and the edge is weighted by the number of such accounts. Analogously,
accounts are connected if and only if there is at least one URL that they both shared, and the edge is
weighted by the number of such URLs. In all cases, we focus on the giant connected component of such
graphs, as described in Section 4.
3 Descriptive statistics
3.1 Posts, reactions and news articles
We first inspect the prevalence of COVID-19 in online conversations by showing the time series of daily
posts on Facebook in Figure 1 (left). We observe a general increase in the overall volume (top), with a
few spikes at the end of January (when China imposed lockdown), at the end of February (when the virus
was first diagnosed in Italy), at mid March (when lockdown was applied in Italy) and at the beginning of
May (when restrictions have been lifted). We provide in the Appendix the time series of daily engagement
(Fig. A1), which has similar characteristics although with a different order of magnitude (up to 1019).
For what concerns controversial topics (bottom), we immediately see that volumes are negligible w.r.t
general conversations (the same holds for daily reactions, which are 2 order of magnitude smaller); also,
they are quite aligned in time but they do exhibit spikes of their own, which are most likely related to
real world events (for instance sabotages of 5G antennas in several countries).
For what concerns the diffusion of URLs, we inspect most popular domains by focusing on their total
engagement. In particular, in the Top-10 ranking of domains we encounter websites which are all related
to Italian Mainstream newspapers, with the exception of Facebook and YouTube which are the 2 most
shared domains. When we focus on the Top-10 ranking of news websites we observe what follows (see
also figures in Appendix):
• Italian Mainstream newspapers generated from 2 to 6 M reactions;
• IT disinformation outlets generated no more than 500k reactions each; The top-3 are a generic
untrustworthy website (“silenziefalsita.it”), the far-right website “ilprimatonazionale.it” and a law
enforcement fan club (“sostenitori.it”)
• only one RU website “it.sputniknews.com” (which is technically in Italian language) generated
more than 100k reactions, whereas the others had a negligible engagement;
• EU and US sources did not receive much attention (most engaged sources did not exceed 3k
reactions).
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Figure 1: (left) Time series of the daily number of posts, total and per topic. (right) Total
engagement generated by news articles for Mainstream (orange), Disinformation domains (green)
and both (blue), for each topic and altogether.
Figure 2: Scatter plot of the number of members vs. number of reactions (left) and number
of posts (center) for each account. Points are grouped in 100 bins to ease the visualization.
(right) Boxplot of the distribution of relative changes in the number of members/followers for
all accounts, for different groups (outliers are filtered).
Similar considerations hold also when analyzing the ranking by number of posts. Overall, as shown in
Figure 1 (right), unreliable sources had a limited yet not negligible amount of engagement (1.5 M) com-
pared to news websites which convey reliable information (35.9 M). Finally it is interesting to notice that
Disinformation sources generate relatively more engagement for the LABS topic, while the MIGRANTS
topic was the most discussed among Mainstream news websites.
3.2 Accounts’ characteristics
For what concerns metrics for accounts5 involved in the analysis (e.g., total engagement, total number of
posts, number of members and total number of shared links), we report that in all cases their distribution
seems to follow power laws, which are common in social networks dimensions (see Appendix, Fig. A2).
When considering separately accounts who discussed on controversial topics, we observe on average an
higher activity compared to the global set of accounts, but we do notice similar distributions of members;
therefore, we analyze the distribution of members versus the other dimensions (see Figure 2 left, centre)
and we notice that (1), as expected, accounts with a larger number of members are more active but also
(2) they were more likely involved in discussions on controversial topics. These results do not change if
we consider Groups or Pages alone. We also consider the relative change in the number of members/likes
of accounts during the observation period. We observe that groups have larger oscillations and higher
(positive) growths compared to pages (see Appendix, Fig. A3); also, we notice that accounts which
5We filtered out accounts with only 1 post to remove noise.
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Figure 3: Histogram of the polarization scores of accounts.
discussed about controversial topics experienced a larger growth compared both to the entire set and
to those which did not discuss about any of them (see Figure 2 right). However, further investigation
is needed to understand whether there is a causality effect between discussing about specific topics and
experiencing a growth in followers/members.
We then analyzed the total engagement generated by different accounts to understand which were the
most influential in general and for each topic. In the former case in the Top-10 ranking (see Appendix,
Table 2) we encounter 5 pages related to newspapers, 1 to a popular pseudo-journalistic TV program (Le
Iene) and 4 pages related to right-wing politicians (in particular 2 pages of Matteo Salvini and 1 page
of Luca Zaia, governor of Veneto region which was one of the most affected by the virus). Each of these
accounts generated from 13 to 50 M reactions during the period of observation.
For what concerns controversial topics, we consider the Top-10 ranking according to the total number
of reactions generated only by posts related to each topic (see Appendix, Tables 3 4 and 5). For what
concerns 5G, we notice that most influential accounts shared only a few related posts (from 2 to 6) but
generated from 90k to almost 2 M reactions (which were accounted by 2 posts of the Italian Health
Ministry). For what concerns LABS, we notice a larger number of posts and total reactions generated,
most of which are accounted by Matteo Salvini leader of the right-wing Lega party. Finally, for what
concerns MIGRANTS we see a larger number of posts/reactions w.r.t to other topics, most of which are
accounted by a newspaper (“Tgcom24”) and Matteo Salvini, respectively with 3.4 M and 1.1 M total
engagement.
3.3 Polarization of accounts and linguistic analysis
To investigate the polarization of accounts towards different topics we introduce a polarization score
ρ = pa−pbpa+pb , where pb is the number of posts of an account about controversial topics, while pa is the
number of posts of an account not about controversial topics. We define a post about controversial
topics if it contains at least one of the manually selected tokens. The polarization index is constrained
between −1, when all the posts of an account are about controversial topics (pa = 0) and +1, when no
posts involved controversial topics (pb = 0). Figure 3 shows the distribution of the polarization scores of
accounts. We notice a trimodal distribution: a peak at ρ = 1 representing accounts not talking about
controversial topics (the greater majority of accounts), a second peak at ρ = 0 that includes accounts
talking equally about controversial and not controversial topics, and a third lower peak at ρ = −1 which
represents accounts posting only about controversial topics. In the Appendix (Figure A5), we show also
how accounts are polarized when comparing topics against each other with the same rationale, i.e., by
defining pa the number of posts about one controversial topic (e.g., 5g) and pb the number of posts about
a different controversial topic (e.g., Labs). Peaks at ρ = +1 and ρ = −1 indicate that most accounts
usually do not talk about more than one controversial topic.
In Figure 4 we show a kernel density plot for the embedding of accounts. For visualization purposes,
we select the first two PCA components. Red indicates controversial accounts whereas blue indicates
remaining ones. Note that, even if the intersection of controversial accounts is negligible (see Table 1)
and the accounts are usually polarized on a single controversial topic (see Figure A5), the embeddings of
the two “classes” distribute differently in all cases. This result suggests that, since the distributions of
the embeddings are different, they might be suitable input features to automatically classify controversial
vs non-controversial accounts – a task beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the first two main components of embeddings of accounts.
4 Sharing diffusion network
To better understand the patterns of sharing diffusion on Facebook, we now focus on the bipartite graph
of accounts and URLs and on its projection upon the two layers, as defined in Section 2.5. Since we are
particularly interested in characterizing controversial URLs and accounts, we will focus on the subgraph
induced by such URLs.
4.1 Bipartite graph
By inspecting the bipartite graph we aim to investigate two related aspects of the COVID-19 infodemic
on Facebook: (i) whether there are niches of accounts where (possibly extreme) conspiracy theories get
diffused; and, conversely, (ii) whether there exists a (relatively) small set of accounts that, altogether,
provide access to a vast majority of all available web resources.
To answer question (i), we look at the connected components of the graph. The giant component of
the entire bipartite graph includes ≈ 57% of all accounts, ≈ 88% of all urls and ≈ 92% of all edges. With
a bit of simplification, this means that (limited to our dataset) more than half of all Facebook accounts
draw upon a unique large pool of web content – with the remaining pieces being essentially negligible as
they are fall out this giant component. Quite interestingly, a similar scenario emerges if we only consider
the set of controversial URLs: this bipartite subgraph has 55,411 vertices (18,681 accounts and 36,730
urls) and 81,707 edges, and its giant component includes ≈ 72% of both accounts and URLs and ≈ 87% of
all edges. Components other than the giant are at least two orders of magnitude smaller in both graphs.
The isolation of specific accounts and URLs into such small components seems to emerge as a conse-
quence of (poor) marketing strategies. For both graphs, in fact, the majority of the components consist
of a small number of accounts – often, just one – sharing many different URLs (cf. Figure A6 in the
Appendix). Through manual investigation, we verified that such phenomenon is oftentimes caused by
a website controlling one or more Facebook pages to promote its articles. A notable case is “howtod-
ofor.com”, which seems to use as many as 17 different accounts, none of which is apparently ascribable to
the website owners. However, a deeper and more rigorous analysis of similar cases is left to future work.
To answer question (ii), (as shown in Figure A7) we observe that few accounts are sufficient to reach
the majority of the URLs shared in the network. To reach the 25% of the URLs we need 88 (0.65%)
accounts, to reach the 50% of the URLs we need 458 (3.42%) accounts, to reach the 75% of the URLs we
need 1,535 (11.48%) accounts, finally to reach the 90% of the URLs we need 3,539 (26.48%) accounts.
4.2 Controversial urls, domains and accounts
We now consider the giant component in the projection of the controversial bipartite graph upon the
two layers of URLs and accounts. This leads to a URL graph with 26,705 vertices and 1,096,672 edges,
and an account graph with 13,363 vertices and 986,509 edges. The diameter, radius and average path
length of the two graphs – 10, 5 and 3.24 for URLs, 10, 5 and 2.86 for accounts – depict a small world
[25, 26], or even ultra-small world6, further confirmed by the global efficiency – 0.33 for URLs, 0.37 for
accounts – and the clustering coefficient – 0.38 for URLs, 0.68 for accounts. This means that we observe
Facebook accounts which often share common sets of URLs. At the same time, visiting a small percentage
of them is enough to cover all the URLs shared in the network, as showed in Figure A7. Altogether,
6A ultra-small world has L ∝ log log N , where L is the average path length and N is the number of nodes.
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(a) URL clusters (b) Account clusters
Figure 5: Prevalence of Mainstream and Disinformation domains in different clusters of the
controversial URLs graph and controversial account graph.
this suggests that if Facebook allowed users to “jump” through groups and pages via shared URLs, they
would likely get to all controversial URLs no matter the stance towards the topic. On the one hand,
finding propaganda items on Facebook appears an easy task; on the other hand, debunking articles are
probably equally easy to find, if the right instruments for browsing content were provided.
To better understand whether Mainstream news and Disinformation items are well mixed on Face-
book, we rely on the manual classification of sources described in Section 2.2. Specifically, we aim to
assess the existence of clusters of URLs and accounts with a strong prevalence of one of the two categories
of domains. As a side result, we expect to gain insights into the possibility to infer the quality of web
content solely based on where and who shared the item. We computed modularity-based clusters relying
on the well-known Louvain algorithm [27]. In Figure 5 we compare the ratio of Mainstream URLs with
the ratio of Disinformation URLs present in each cluster, and in the entire graph of URLs/accounts. We
see that the ratio of deceptive URLs is very low for almost all clusters, and that in general news-related
URLs are a minority. This is mainly a consequence of the high prevalence of domains relying on user
generated content and that, as such, cannot be classified – e.g., “facebook.com” and “youtube.com”
account for, respectively, ≈ 48% and ≈ 4% of all URLs.
Focusing on clusters of URLs, we argue that the most interesting cluster is cluster 2, the third
largest cluster (2,179 URLs from 345 different domains) with a share of Disinformatiom domains that,
albeit being barely over 10%, is notably larger than that of the entire URL graph. Ten domains appear in
cluster 2, and they are all well-known websites which share sovereignty propaganda and false stories (from
“voxnews.info” to “ilprimatonazionale.it”). However, the cluster also includes URLs from 20 Mainstream
domains, showing that propaganda is apparently well-mixed with Mainstream information. Conversely,
the only strongly polarized cluster of URLs, which includes almost 60% of disinfo URLs, is in reality
similar to the small connected components discussed in Section 4.1 and, as such, of limited interest: it
is very small (less that 100 URLs), dominated by just a few domains, and apparently consisting of a few
web sites promoting each other.
For what regards accounts, almost all clusters – including larger ones – have a negligible presence
of disinformation URLs, a further element in favor of the existence of a body of web resources shared
on/by groups and pages with very different audiences. The only clusters of accounts with a large share of
disinformation are very small clusters of, at most, 12 accounts. It is interesting to notice that the names
of these clusters include a mix of references to cross-ideological political parties and local movements,
thus suggesting that disinformation spreads across political affiliation.
Finally, we analyzed the centrality of individual URLs and accounts in the graph based on their
PageRank[28], degree and strength [25, 26]. For URLs, we observe (cf. Table 7) that most central
URLs generally convey mainstream, institutional and scientific content, with a few notable exceptions:
six Youtube videos (one of which embedded in a Facebook post) that went viral during the COVID-
19 infodemic, all related to counter-information and alternative propaganda – three of which are not
available on Youtube anymore. Besides, all of these belong to the aforementioned cluster 2, which
includes other widespread content as well: 2 news items from mainstream media outlets but very popular
among conspirationists (an interview to an “expert” claiming that the virus is indeed a biological weapon,
published by “TgCom24”, and an article about the role of particulate in the epidemics, published by
“AGI”); finally, a few URLs linking to scientific papers, data analysis and visualization of the pandemic.
Two insights can be drawn: on the one hand, propaganda items are so popular that they invade the
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general debate on Facebook and are often found in accounts that also share factual and rigorous news
items; on the other hand, a categorization of disinformation domains is useful but insufficient, because
most popular disinformation content is shared as user generated content on platforms such as Youtube
and Facebook, thus needing manual verification to flag them as harmful.
For what concerns central accounts, we see that most of them make explicit references to anti-
establishment journalists, known counter-information bloggers, and conspiracy theories. Quite interest-
ingly, we also see that these are mostly groups and do not coincide with the top ranking accounts emerged
in Section 3.2, i.e., the greatest engagement is generated by accounts that are not among the most central
in the network built upon URL shares. We may argue that controversial opinions are mostly shaped on
groups, based on URLs shared by other users, and then just “gathered” on the public pages of political
leaders and parties.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated online conversations about COVID-19 and related controversial topics
on Facebook, during a period of 4 months and analyzing more than 1.5 M posts shared by almost
80k groups and pages. We first noticed that discussions on controversial topics, which had a smaller
volume of interactions compared to the pandemic in general, induced polarized clusters of accounts in
terms of both topic coverage and lexicon. We then observed that, in accordance with recent literature,
sources of (supposedly) reliable information had a higher engagement compared to websites sharing
unreliable content. However, we also realized the limitations of source-based approaches when analyzing
an information ecosystem wherein user generated content has a paramount role. Finally, we highlighted a
“small-world effect” in the sharing network of URLs, with the result that users on Facebook who navigate
on a limited set of pages/groups can be potentially exposed to a wide range of content, from extreme
propaganda to verified information. In this network, the central role is taken by popular groups, in
contrast with popular pages being those generating the greatest engagement.
Future directions of research include further investigating the differences in the activity of groups
and pages which focus on controversial topics. In particular, we aim to understand whether language
differences might be effectively employed to distinguish accounts who were particularly active (or not) on
specific subjects, and to extend the analysis of reliable vs. unreliable information to platforms for video
and image sharing such as YouTube and Instagram.
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Appendix
The complete lists of italian words used to define the thee controversial topics are the following (we
include also the feminine and plural forms, omitted here for clarity purposes).
• “5G”: elettromagnetismo, onda, radiazione, wireless];
• “LABS”: cavia, espetimento, sperimentato, sperimentazione;
• “MIGRANTS”: africa, barcone, clandestino, extracomunitario, immigrato, islam, musulmano, ne-
gro, niger, ONG, profugo, senegal, straniero
Figure A1: Time series of the daily number of reactions for all posts (left) and depending on
the controversial topic (right).
Account No. posts No. reactions
Le Iene 256 49869767
Fanpage.it 3043 49234295
Corriere della Sera 2119 28004758
Vittorio Sgarbi 98 21865677
Tgcom24 2559 19654257
Sky TG24 1494 19259609
Notizie.it 2513 16907208
Matteo Salvini 215 16719496
Luca Zaia 207 16068773
Lega - Salvini Premier 1386 13187120
Table 2: Top-10 ranking of all accounts by total engagement generated.
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Account No. posts No. reactions
Ministero della Salute 2 1863319
Nicola Morra 2 982903
Che tempo che fa 4 383441
Quarto Grado 2 294430
Sfera 3 121635
Lorenzo Tosa 2 108586
Abolizione del suffragio universale 3 108491
Il Sole 24 ORE 6 104433
Angelo DURO 2 92855
Fondazione Poliambulanza Istituto Ospedaliero Multispecialistico 2 90481
Table 3: Top-10 ranking of 5G accounts by total engagement generated.
Account No. posts No. reactions
Matteo Salvini 19 1443184
Nicola Porro 12 454688
Silvia Sardone 9 416352
Lega - Salvini Premier 55 382654
Medici con l’Africa Cuamm 20 331577
Tg3 18 280473
Sky TG24 7 220786
Local Team 3 200964
Abolizione del suffragio universale 7 173648
Fanpage.it 26 169921
Table 4: Top-10 ranking of LABS accounts by total engagement generated.
Account No. posts No. reactions
Tgcom24 58 3408934
Matteo Salvini 12 1157440
Kiko.Co 2 826064
Luca Zaia 9 603693
Gianni Simioli 3 577797
Vincenzo De Luca 25 535635
Tg1 3 489346
Sky TG24 20 442357
Il Messaggero.it 21 406447
Tg3 16 382325
Table 5: Top-10 ranking of MIGRANTS accounts by total engagement generated.
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Figure A2: Complementary cumulative distribution function for several metrics. We show all
accounts and according to different topics.
Figure A3: Boxplot of the distribution of relative changes in the number of members/followers
for all accounts, groups and pages.
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Figure A4: Top-10 ranking of news sources per different news domain according to the total
engagement generated. In clockwise order from top left we show US, RU, IT, EU disinformation
sources and finally IT Mainstream sources.
Figure A5: Normalized histogram of polarization index of accounts, by pairs of topics.
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(a) Whole graph (b) Controversial subgraph
Figure A6: Number of urls and accounts in all components of the bipartite graph other than
the giant, for both the whole graph and the topical subgraph. The marker size is proportional
to the total number of vertices of the component.
Figure A7: Percentage of reached URLs when visiting accounts in decreasing order of degree
centrality.
url pagerank degree strength louvain
governo.it/it/articolo/decreto-iorestoacasa-do... 0.00211 2467 3777 0
youtube.com/watch?v=RsoG7pZifTw 0.00202 4605 8284 2
la7.it/piazzapulita/video/coronavirus-dentro-i... 0.00129 3146 4351 0
tgcom24.mediaset.it/mondo/coronavirus-lesperto... 0.00109 3320 4867 2
agi.it/cronaca/news/2020-04-24/inquinamento-pa... 0.00103 2299 3083 2
salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettagl... 0.00096 1586 2087 0
youtube.com/watch?v=JXW2BNFzAtQ 0.00087 2350 3258 2
worldometers.info/coronavirus 0.00085 2353 3052 2
covidvisualizer.com 0.00085 1780 2272 2
youtube.com/watch?v=4cX7PJbV4qs 0.0008 2002 2763 2
nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2001468 0.00078 2504 3629 2
youtube.com/watch?v=c8czMPZdAU8 0.00077 2145 3073 2
fanpage.it/politica/la-protezione-civile-chied... 0.00076 2344 3242 2
youtube.com/watch?v=PGVBGh32f-s 0.00076 1956 2649 2
fanpage.it/attualita/coronavirus-fuga-da-milan... 0.00074 2020 2584 6
it.businessinsider.com/ernesto-burgio-2-o-3-co... 0.00074 1414 1859 0
salute.gov.it/nuovocoronavirus 0.00071 1020 1209 0
gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/i... 0.00068 1343 1640 2
facebook.com/giuseppe.provenza.5209/videos/231... 0.00066 2160 3070 2
Table 6: The top 20 controversial URLs by pagerank.
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account pagerank degree strength louvain tot controversial
Gruppo Tutto TRAVAGLIO Forever 0.00169 3263 5325 1 2671
Arcipelago delle Sardine 0.00155 3041 4054 0 1905
Luisella Costamagna Fan’s club 0.00144 2649 4257 1 2119
Dalla vostra parte 0.00141 2045 4043 2 2397
Morris San 0.00133 2087 3737 1 3492
Coronavirus Covid-19 Gruppo di discussione 0.00121 2739 3472 2 1232
IO RESTO A CASA 0.00116 2377 2862 5 5861
Marco Travaglio&Peter Gomez 0.00116 2523 3495 1 1509
Amici a cui piace Nicola Porro 0.00113 1855 3072 2 1372
Chiediamo al Presidente Conte il test sierolog... 0.00109 2015 2659 2 937
Come Davide contro Golia 0.00107 1781 3273 1 1268
Coronavirus fase 2: Italia che rinasce! 0.00098 2318 2736 1 564
Sostenitori di Byoblu (gruppo non ufficiale) 0.00097 1597 2672 1 1179
Vaccini Puliti. Rimozione dal commercio dei pr... 0.00094 1594 2652 1 980
#SAPEVATELO 0.00093 2099 2676 0 941
Con il M5S e Conte Premier 0.00093 1762 2588 1 1204
MOVIMENTO DEI DISOCCUPATI E DEI PRECARI - LAVO... 0.00091 1589 2543 1 1275
Manifestazione al Senato 0.0009 1727 2364 0 1244
IL RUGGITO DEL CONIGLIO 0.0009 2128 2382 6 804
Table 7: The top 20 controversial accounts by pagerank.
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